Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

Preprint OPEN
Mikhail Golosov; Vasiliki Skreta; Aleh Tsyvinski; Andrea Wilson;
(2011)
  • Subject: Asymmetric information, Cheap talk, Dynamic strategic communication, Full information revelation
    • jel: jel:D83 | jel:D82

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision maker takes an action. Our main result is that, in contrast to a static environment, full information revelation... View more
  • References (11)
    11 references, page 1 of 2

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