publication . Article . 2017

Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reason

Sinclair, Neil;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jun 2017 Journal: Dialectica, volume 71, pages 209-229 (issn: 0012-2017, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Wiley
  • Country: China (People's Republic of)
What is the connection between reasons and motives? According to Reasons Internalism, there is a non-trivial conceptual connection between normative reasons and the possibility of rationally accessing relevant motivation. Reasons Internalism is attractive insofar as it captures the thought that reasons are for reasoning with and repulsive insofar as it fails to generate sufficient critical distance between reasons and motives. Rather than directly adjudicate this dispute, I extract from it two generally accepted desiderata on theories of normative reasons and argue that a new theory can satisfy both. The new theory locates part of the meaning of normative reason...
free text keywords: Normative, Epistemology, Philosophy, Internalism and externalism, Adjudication
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publication . Article . 2017

Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reason

Sinclair, Neil;