Orthodox narratives of US foreign policy have been employed as uncontested modes of historical interpretation with US post-Cold War foreign policy in the Third World characterised by discontinuity from its earlier Cold War objectives. Chomsky's work adopts an alternativ... View more
1 For a small, but representative sample see Michael Cox, Takashi Inoguchi and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael E. Brown , Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
2 See for example the self proclaimed dissident IR theorist David Campbell, 'Political Prosaics, Transversal Politics, and the Anarchical World', in Michael J. Shapiro and Hayward R. Alker, Challenging Boundaries (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 7-32.
3 See, for example, Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). There are a much smaller number of mainstream IR theorists and analysts who examine continuities between the Cold War and post-Cold War period. However, they still accept as unproblematic the contestable claim that US foreign policy is essentially benign and was defensively driven during the Cold War. For a selection of IR theorists who outline a number of continuities see Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', in International Security, 18:2 (1993), pp. 44-79; Colin Gray, 'Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past-with GPS', in Review of International Studies, 25 (Special Issue, 1999), pp. 161-82.
10 George Kennan, 'Reflections on Containment', in Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containing the Soviet Union, p. 16.
11 Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter Terrorism, 1940-1990 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992).
12 See Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision-A Memoir (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1989), pp. 214-55.
13 For the classic conservative articulation of this perspective, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New York: American Enterprise Institute, 1982); see also Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1984).
14 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Towards Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 1947-1950: The Roaring of the Cataract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
15 Samuel Huntington, 'America's Changing Strategic Interests', in Survival, 23:1 (1991), pp. 3-17; Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); John Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape 'The Answer: A Partition Plan for Bosnia', The New Republic, 14 June 1993; Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
16 Robert Skidelsky, The World After Communism: A Polemic For Our Times (London: Macmillan, 1995); John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', in International Security, 15 (1990), pp. 5-56.