The sexual domain is unified only by the phenomenal quality of the occurrence of the desires, activities, and pleasures it includes. There is no conceptual restriction on the range of intentional objects those desires, activities, and pleasures can take. Neither is ther... View more
1 Igor Primoratz, 'Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2001), 201-218.
2 See, for example: Alan Wertheimer, 'Consent and Sexual Relations', Legal Theory 2 (1996), 89-112, §§ 1-3; David Archard, Sexual Consent (Boulder CO: Westview, 1998), esp. chs. 3-5.
3 Primoratz, 'Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?', 201.
4 See, for example, Elizabeth Anscombe, Contraception and Chastity, with sub-headings by Mary Gormally (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2003; first published 1975).
25 Seiriol Morgan, 'Sex in the Head', Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2003), 1-16, 4-5.
26 Alan Soble, 'Masturbation, Again', in The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, edited by Alan Soble and Nicholas Power (fifth edition, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 94. Compare Primoratz, Ethics and Sex, 27.
27 Rockney Jacobsen, 'Arousal and the Ends of Desire', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993), 617-632, 629.
28 Solomon, 'Sexual Paradigms', 343; Scruton, Sexual Desire, 75.
29 Cindy Meston and David Buss, 'Why Humans Have Sex', Archives of Sexual Behaviour 36 (2007), 477-507.
30 Seiriol Morgan, 'Dark Desires', Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2003), 377-410; see esp. 379-80; see also Morgan, 'Sex in the Head', 6-7.