publication . Thesis

Essays on political economy of fiscal policy

Katayama, Kentaro;
Open Access English
  • Country: United Kingdom
Chapter 2 analyzes the political economy of delayed agreements over fiscal reforms, in a setting where two interest groups can bargain over the allocation of the cost of the stabilization, using an alternating offers model. This contrasts with Alesina and Drazen (1991), where the group that concedes earlier bears a fixed disproportionate share of the burden. This allows a systematic comparison of expected delay in the bargaining game, i.e., "the coalition government" and in the concession game, i.e., "the divided government". When interest groups are sufficiently patient, or when shares in the concession game are highly unequal, agreement is reached more quickly...
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