Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity

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Cartwright, Edward; Wooders, Myrna Holtz;
  • Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
  • Subject: HB
    arxiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory

Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make his action choice conditional on his role. Our ... View more
  • References (13)
    13 references, page 1 of 2

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