publication . Thesis

Three essays on mechanism design and institutions\ud

Boukouras, Aristotelis;
Open Access English
  • Country: United Kingdom
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with both mechanism design and political economy issues. The\ud first chapter examines the conditions under which information aggregation (through an\ud appropriately designed mechanism) can solve hidden-types (also commonly referred\ud as adverse selection) problems. The remaining two chapters adopt a contract theory\ud approach in order to explain prominent institutions of many contemporary political\ud regimes. Chapter two provides a theory on why laws, which restrict the freedom of\ud private parties to commit on certain transactions, may actually be beneficial for increasing\ud social surplus and promoting economic growth and how th...
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23 references, page 1 of 2

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