This article provides a critique of Louise Arbour's article ‘The responsibility to protect as a duty of care in international law and practice’. Proceeding through criticisms of Arbour's specific propositions, the thesis is advanced that the perverse effect of the ‘duty... View more
20 The argument here builds on that originally developed by David Chandler in 'The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the “Liberal Peace”', International Peacekeeping, 11:1 (2004), pp. 59-81.
21 For an example of this type of argument, cf. Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 228-99.
22 For a treatment of the dangers of this move in the domestic sphere, cf. Andrew Ashworth, 'Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence', International Journal of Evidence and Proof, 10 (2006), p. 241.
23 Peter Gowan, 'The New Liberal Cosmopolitanism', in Daniele Archibuigi (ed.), Debating Cosmopolitics (London and New York: Verso, 2003), p. 52.
24 Amitai Etzioni, 'Sovereignty as Responsibility', Orbis (Winter 2006), p. 72.
25 Arbour, 'The responsibility to protect', p. 454. Not least because, as we shall see, Arbour contradicts this claim later when she suggests that the doctrine exacts greater duties from powerful states.
26 Tan, 'The Duty to Protect', p. 86.
27 Ibid., p. 96.
28 This problem is linked to the impossibility of articulating in advance the criteria to judge when the 'responsibility to protect' has been breached. See Alex J. Bellamy, 'The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention', International Affairs, 84:4 (2008), p. 148.
34 Cf. Mitchell Dean, 'Military Intervention as “Police” Action?', in Markus D. Dubber and Mariana Valverde (eds), The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and International Governance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 196-200 and passim.