Novel colours and the content of experience

Article English OPEN
Macpherson, F.;
(2003)
  • Publisher: Blackwell Publishing
  • Subject: BD

I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including wh... View more
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