Petitio principii: the case for non-fallaciousness

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Cummings, L;
  • Publisher: University of Windsor

This paper presents a case for the non-fallaciousness of petitio principii in the context where the only evidence which can confirm the conclusion of an argument has a content which is identical to the content of the conclusion. The more usual rhetorical and dialectical... View more
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