Primary auction of slots at European airports

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Pertuiset, Thomas ; Santos, Georgina (2014)

We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade.
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    Button, K. (2008), 'Auctions - What can we learn from auction theory for slot allocation?', in Czerny, A., Forsyth, P., Gillen, D., Niemeier, H.-M. (Eds.) (2008), Airport Slots: International Experiences and Options for Reform, Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, Chapter 16, 291-309.

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    Whalen, W.T., Carlton, D.W., Heyer, K. and O.M. Richard (2008), 'A Solution to Airport Delays', Regulation, 31(1), 30-36.

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