Tenenbaum and Raffaman on vague projects, the Self-Torturer, and the sorites

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Elson, Luke (2016)

Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman contend that ‘vague projects’ motivate radical revisions to orthodox, utility-maximising rational choice theory. Their argument cannot succeed if such projects merely ground instances of the paradox of the sorites, or heap. Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to this, and argue that Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer does not rest on the sorites. I argue that their argument both fails to generalise to most vague projects, and is ineffective in the case of the Self-Torturer itself.
  • References (5)

    1. Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the SelfTorturer,” Ethics 123 ð2012Þ: 86-112.

    2. See Warren S. Quinn, “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” Philosophical Studies 59 ð1990Þ: 79-90, esp. 79, for the canonical presentation.

    3. Ibid., 79.

    12. See, e.g., Adam Elga, “Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp,” Philosophers' Imprint 10 ð2010Þ: 1-11, 4.

    19. See, e.g., Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the SelfTorturer,” 94.

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