Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction

Article English OPEN
Young, G (2015)
  • Publisher: Springer

This paper examines the relationship between knowing how to G and the ability to G, which is typically presented in one of the following ways: (a) knowing how to G entails the ability to G; (b) knowing how to G does not entail the ability to G. In an attempt to reconcile these two putatively opposing positions, I distinguish between type and token actions. I t is my contention that S can know how to G in the absence of an ability to G token, where this action is derived from an action-type, but not in the absence of the ability to perform the action-type itself (G type). This refinement is an attempt to reconcile differences between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism (broadly construed) with regard to knowledge how and ability.
  • References (4)

    Fridland, E. (2013). Problems with Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies, 165, 879- 891.

    Hawley, K. (2003). Success and Knowledge How. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40(1), 19-31.

    Noƫ, A. (2005). Against Intellectualism. Analysis, 65(4), 278-290.

    Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411- 3444.

  • Metrics
    views in OpenAIRE
    views in local repository
    downloads in local repository

    The information is available from the following content providers:

    From Number Of Views Number Of Downloads
    Institutional Repository - IRUS-UK 0 98
Share - Bookmark