A detail-free mediator

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Vida, Peter; Azacis, Helmuts; Cardiff University;
(2012)
  • Publisher: Cardiff University
  • Subject: HB
    acm: TheoryofComputation_GENERAL | ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING | TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
    arxiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory

We present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a de... View more
  • References (20)
    20 references, page 1 of 2

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