publication . Article . 2011

Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study

Sotiris Georganas; John Kagel;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Jan 2011
  • Publisher: Elsevier
  • Country: United Kingdom
Abstract
We study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) [6] model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without, in line with the theory.
Subjects
ACM Computing Classification System: TheoryofComputation_GENERALTheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
free text keywords: HB, Economics and Econometrics, Risk neutral, Nash model, Common value auction, Economics, Microeconomics, Unique bid auction
Funded by
NSF| Collaborative Research on Team versus Individual Play
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0451981
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences

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