The probationary period as a screening device: competitive markets
Spreeuw, J.; Karlsson, M.;
Publisher: Faculty of Actuarial Science & Insurance, City University London
Seminal papers about asymmetry of information in a competitive insurance market, and the monetary deductible as a screening device show that any existing equilibrium is of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance whilst low risks buy partial insurance. Roths... View more
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