Corporate control and multiple large shareholders

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Dhillon, Amrita; Rossetto, Silvia;
  • Publisher: University of Warwick, Department of Economics
  • Subject: HD

Many firms have more than one blockholder, but finance theory suggests that one blockholder should be sufficient to bestow all benefits on a firm that arise from concentrated ownership. This paper identifies a reason why more blockholders may arise endogenously. We cons... View more
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