Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy : a comment

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Dhillon, Amrita ; Lockwood, Ben

The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate, 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election. This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999).
  • References (10)

    Combining the two, we have:

    ! 2. But then he is


    2)e (12)


    = 1 (13)

    But then (12) and (13) yield the right result.


    n 2 (11)


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