Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent
Bapat, NA; De la Calle, L; Hinkkainen, KH; McLean, EV;
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if ... View more
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