publication . Other literature type . Article . 2016

Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

Bapat, NA; De la Calle, L; Hinkkainen, KH; McLean, EV;
English
  • Published: 01 Jan 2016
  • Publisher: The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill University Libraries
  • Country: United Kingdom
Abstract
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with the proposed strategy of punishing sponsors while cooperating with hosts, creates incentives for sponsors to misrepresent themselves as host states while continuing their support for terrorists. We demonstrate that in this ...
Subjects
free text keywords: Sanctions, Economic sanctions, Incentive, Terrorism, Political science, Political economy
Funded by
NSF| Collaborative Research: The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0921264
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
49 references, page 1 of 4

Aksoy, Deniz, and David B. Carter. 2012. “Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups.” British Journal of Political Science 1:1-24.

Allen, Susan H. 2005. “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success or Failure.” International Interactions 31 (2): 117-38.

Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Marina, Ali Fisunoglu, Jacek Kugler, Mark Abdollahian, Kristin Johnson, Kyungkook Kang, and Zining Yang. 2013. “Replication Data for: Relative Political Capacity Dataset.” Transresearch Consortium, V4. http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/rpc/faces/study/Study Page.xhtml?globalIdphdl:1902.1/16845 (accessed November 15, 2013).

Bapat, Navin A. 2012. “Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups.” British Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 1-29.

Bapat, Navin A., Daniel Ertley, Chansonette Hall, and Mark Lancaster. 2007. “Perfect Allies? The Case of Iraq and al Qaeda.” International Studies Perspectives 8 (3): 272-86.

Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshi Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “The Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39 (1): 79-98.

Bapat, Navin A., and T. Clifton Morgan. 2009. “Multilateral versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 1075-94.

Barbieri, Katherine, and Omar Keshk. 2012. “Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0.” http://correlatesofwar.org (accessed November 15, 2013).

Byman, Daniel. 2005a. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Byman, Daniel. 2005b. “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism.” Survival 47 (4): 117-44.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 2001. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. [OpenAIRE]

Carter, David. 2015. “The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups.” International Studies Quarterly 59 (3): 461- 76.

Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis 18 (3): 271-92.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice 143 (2): 67-101.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2005. “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (4): 625-33.

49 references, page 1 of 4
Abstract
Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if foreign states are truly sponsors versus hosts and cannot perfectly determine the type of foreign support terrorists are receiving. We argue that this uncertainty, coupled with the proposed strategy of punishing sponsors while cooperating with hosts, creates incentives for sponsors to misrepresent themselves as host states while continuing their support for terrorists. We demonstrate that in this ...
Subjects
free text keywords: Sanctions, Economic sanctions, Incentive, Terrorism, Political science, Political economy
Funded by
NSF| Collaborative Research: The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0921264
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
49 references, page 1 of 4

Aksoy, Deniz, and David B. Carter. 2012. “Electoral Institutions and the Emergence of Terrorist Groups.” British Journal of Political Science 1:1-24.

Allen, Susan H. 2005. “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success or Failure.” International Interactions 31 (2): 117-38.

Arbetman-Rabinowitz, Marina, Ali Fisunoglu, Jacek Kugler, Mark Abdollahian, Kristin Johnson, Kyungkook Kang, and Zining Yang. 2013. “Replication Data for: Relative Political Capacity Dataset.” Transresearch Consortium, V4. http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/rpc/faces/study/Study Page.xhtml?globalIdphdl:1902.1/16845 (accessed November 15, 2013).

Bapat, Navin A. 2012. “Understanding State Sponsorship of Militant Groups.” British Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 1-29.

Bapat, Navin A., Daniel Ertley, Chansonette Hall, and Mark Lancaster. 2007. “Perfect Allies? The Case of Iraq and al Qaeda.” International Studies Perspectives 8 (3): 272-86.

Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshi Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. 2013. “The Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39 (1): 79-98.

Bapat, Navin A., and T. Clifton Morgan. 2009. “Multilateral versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (4): 1075-94.

Barbieri, Katherine, and Omar Keshk. 2012. “Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 3.0.” http://correlatesofwar.org (accessed November 15, 2013).

Byman, Daniel. 2005a. Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Byman, Daniel. 2005b. “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism.” Survival 47 (4): 117-44.

Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan. 2001. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. [OpenAIRE]

Carter, David. 2015. “The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups.” International Studies Quarterly 59 (3): 461- 76.

Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. “Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis 18 (3): 271-92.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice 143 (2): 67-101.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2005. “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 49 (4): 625-33.

49 references, page 1 of 4
Powered by OpenAIRE Research Graph
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue