Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrorism, and the Incentive to Misrepresent

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Bapat, NA; De la Calle, L; Hinkkainen, KH; McLean, EV;
  • Publisher: University of Chicago Press

Can economic sanctions combat transnational terrorism effectively? Policy makers argue that sanctions can deter state sponsorship but are counterproductive against hosts of transnational terrorists. However, recent cases indicate that governments are often uncertain if ... View more
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