The Global AML Framework and its Jurisdictional Limits
The thesis examines the intricacies of the global AML/CFT framework focusing largely on the three jurisdictions of United Kingdom, Uganda and South Africa. These jurisdictions were selected to test the hypothetical model on which this study was undertaken. While appreciating the importance for states to embrace global prohibition regimes to deal with overlapping interstate issues such as money laundering, these regimes often tend to overlook practical realities in member countries they are implemented. Since the global AML framework is implemented through the compliance of individual states, its efficacy would depend on the propensity of individual states to harness it.\ud There is anecdotal evidence to corroborate the thesis that the current global AML/CFT framework is not compatible with the regulatory environment across the majority of LDCs. Thus, this presupposes that it cannot be applicable globally. LDCs are saddled by general systemic failure, lack of economic and social infrastructure; lack of physical and human resources, corruption and its corruptive effective on regulatory institutions and national governments. Even with the best intent, in the foregoing precarious environment, desired AML laws cannot effectively work as expected. Also, by design or default, soft law instruments (for example the FATF forty plus nine recommendations are not easy apply, let alone enforce globally.\ud The study proposes the need for countries to undertake desired reform programmes before they can countenance the adoption of the global AML/CFT framework. Since money laundering crimes are jurisdictional problematic—not amenable within the realm of individual states, it is imperative to introduce a global AML court. It is also imperative for states to consider adopting hybrid measures such as mutual recognition paradigm in Europe to ease their co-existence on overlapping global regulatory challenges. States should also explore the possibility of harnessing norms of CIL as opposed to prescribing regulatory regimes every time there is a crisis. However, it needs to be noted that the envisaged global AML/CFT regimes cannot crystallize into norms of CIL, unless they are willingly embraced by countries and not imposed.