publication . Article . Conference object . 2008

Unassailable sensor networks

Alessandro Mei; Alessandro Panconesi; Jaikumar Radhakrishnan;
Closed Access
  • Published: 22 Sep 2008
Abstract
We show that massive attacks against sensor networks that use random key pre-distribution schemes cannot be cheap, provided that the parameters are set in the right way. By choosing them appropriately, any adversary whose aim is to compromise a large fraction of the communication links is forced, with overwhelming probability, to capture a large fraction of the nodes. This holds regardless of the information available to the adversary to select the nodes. We consider two important security properties: We say that the network is unassailable if the adversary cannot compromise a linear fraction of the communication links by compromising a sub-linear fraction of th...
Subjects
arXiv: Computer Science::Cryptography and Security
free text keywords: Partition (number theory), Distributed computing, Vertex connectivity, Adversary, Compromise, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Computer science, Security properties, Computer network, business.industry, business, Computer security, computer.software_genre, computer, Giant component, Wireless sensor network
Powered by OpenAIRE Open Research Graph
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue
publication . Article . Conference object . 2008

Unassailable sensor networks

Alessandro Mei; Alessandro Panconesi; Jaikumar Radhakrishnan;