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Other research product . Other ORP type . 2014

Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under Uncertainty

Danan, Eric; Gajdos, Thibault; Hill, Brian; Tallon, Jean-Marc;
English  
Published: 01 Jul 2014
Publisher: HAL CCSD
Country: France
Abstract
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/; Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.63 - ISSN : 1955-611X; We provide possibility results on the aggregation of beliefs and tastes for Monotone, Bernoullian and Archimedian preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (2011). We propose a new axiom, Unambiguous Pareto Dominance, which requires that if the unambiguous part of individuals' preferences over a pair of acts agree, then society should follow them. We characterize the resulting social preferences and show that it is enough that individuals share a prior to allow non dictatorial aggregation. A further weakening of this axiom on common-taste acts, where cardinal preferences are identical, is also characterized. It gives rise to a set of relevant priors at the social level that can be any subset of the convex hull of the individuals' sets of relevant priors. We then apply these general results to the Maxmin Expected Utility model, the Choquet Expected Utility model and the Smooth Ambiguity model. We end with a characterization of the aggregation of ambiguity attitudes.
Subjects

Preference Aggregation, Social Choice, Uncertainty, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance

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(2014): “Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem with Incomplete Preferences,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.

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Funded by
ANR| AmGames
Project
AmGames
Ambiguity in Games: The Role of Uncertainty in Strategic Interactions
  • Funder: French National Research Agency (ANR) (ANR)
  • Project Code: ANR-12-FRAL-0008
,
ANR| Amidex
Project
Amidex
INITIATIVE D'EXCELLENCE AIX MARSEILLE UNIVERSITE
  • Funder: French National Research Agency (ANR) (ANR)
  • Project Code: ANR-11-IDEX-0001
,
ANR| IPS
Project
IPS
Idex Paris-Saclay
  • Funder: French National Research Agency (ANR) (ANR)
  • Project Code: ANR-11-IDEX-0003