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Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under Uncertainty
Aggregating Tastes, Beliefs, and Attitudes under Uncertainty
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/; Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.63 - ISSN : 1955-611X; We provide possibility results on the aggregation of beliefs and tastes for Monotone, Bernoullian and Archimedian preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (2011). We propose a new axiom, Unambiguous Pareto Dominance, which requires that if the unambiguous part of individuals' preferences over a pair of acts agree, then society should follow them. We characterize the resulting social preferences and show that it is enough that individuals share a prior to allow non dictatorial aggregation. A further weakening of this axiom on common-taste acts, where cardinal preferences are identical, is also characterized. It gives rise to a set of relevant priors at the social level that can be any subset of the convex hull of the individuals' sets of relevant priors. We then apply these general results to the Maxmin Expected Utility model, the Choquet Expected Utility model and the Smooth Ambiguity model. We end with a characterization of the aggregation of ambiguity attitudes.
- Aix-Marseille University France
- Université Paris Diderot France
Uncertainty, Preference Aggregation, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, Social Choice, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Uncertainty, Preference Aggregation, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty, Social Choice, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).0 popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.Average influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).Average impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.Average citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).0 popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.Average influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).Average impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.Average
Citations provided by BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!- Aix-Marseille University France
- Université Paris Diderot France
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/; Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.63 - ISSN : 1955-611X; We provide possibility results on the aggregation of beliefs and tastes for Monotone, Bernoullian and Archimedian preferences of Cerreia-Vioglio, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi (2011). We propose a new axiom, Unambiguous Pareto Dominance, which requires that if the unambiguous part of individuals' preferences over a pair of acts agree, then society should follow them. We characterize the resulting social preferences and show that it is enough that individuals share a prior to allow non dictatorial aggregation. A further weakening of this axiom on common-taste acts, where cardinal preferences are identical, is also characterized. It gives rise to a set of relevant priors at the social level that can be any subset of the convex hull of the individuals' sets of relevant priors. We then apply these general results to the Maxmin Expected Utility model, the Choquet Expected Utility model and the Smooth Ambiguity model. We end with a characterization of the aggregation of ambiguity attitudes.