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Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего
Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего
A sequential truel is a generalisation of duel. This type of games is known because of the «survival of the weakest» paradox, where weakest player have the highest probability of survival. We analyse a typical variation of this model, in which players are allowed to shoot in the air. We show that there exists a SPE-equilibrium, where the strongest player, against the paradox statement, has the highest probability of survival.
C72 - Noncooperative Games, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
C72 - Noncooperative Games, C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
A sequential truel is a generalisation of duel. This type of games is known because of the «survival of the weakest» paradox, where weakest player have the highest probability of survival. We analyse a typical variation of this model, in which players are allowed to shoot in the air. We show that there exists a SPE-equilibrium, where the strongest player, against the paradox statement, has the highest probability of survival.