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  • Publication . Other literature type . Article . 2019
    Open Access English
    Authors: 
    Manolo Martínez;
    Publisher: Elsevier
    Country: Spain

    I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

Include:
1 Research products, page 1 of 1
  • Publication . Other literature type . Article . 2019
    Open Access English
    Authors: 
    Manolo Martínez;
    Publisher: Elsevier
    Country: Spain

    I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories.

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