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Abstract This article analyzes the audio diaries of a Tibetan physician, originally from Amdo (Qinghai Province, China), now living in New York City. Dr. Kunchog Tseten describes his experiences during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, in spring and summer 2020, when Queens, New York—the location where he lives and works—was the “epicenter of the epicenter” of the novel coronavirus outbreak in the United States. The collaborative research project of which this diary is a part combines innovative methodological approaches to qualitative, ethnographic study during this era of social distancing with an attunement to the relationship between language, culture, and health care. Dr. Kunchog’s diary and our analysis of its contents illustrate the ways that Tibetan medicine and Tibetan cultural practices, including those emergent from Buddhism, have helped members of the Himalayan and Tibetan communities in New York City navigate this unprecedented moment with care and compassion.

In the Economic Impact Payment letter to American citizens in Spring 2020, President Donald Trump wrote that “we wage total war on this invisible enemy.” Trump likely did not intend to explicitly link this to the rich theory about “total war” in military history, but this article examines the American rhetoric surrounding the war on COVID-19 to see whether it corresponds to definitions of total war in military strategic thought. The Clausewitzian origins of the idea of “absolute war” and limited war will also be examined to ascertain their relevance as a framework for understanding the American approach to the conflict with the virus. A total war strategy would have implied either mobilizing the entire population into the health sector or imposing a total national lockdown. This article examines both the strategy outlined by Donald Trump and the reality of what was undertaken by the Federal Government. The military was involved in the war effort against the virus in the U.S., but only in a logistical and financial sense. A national lockdown was never intended due to its potential adverse effects on the economy, and in any case, the Federal Government did not have the authority to impose health policy on individual states and local authorities. The result was a variety of local responses to the crisis with little federal coordination, much like what occurred with the Influenza Epidemic of 1918-19. Despite its military and hyperbolic rhetoric, the Trump Administration did not choose a total war strategy. Instead, it decided to adopt a limited holding strategy that accepted human losses while protecting the economy and waiting for a Government-sponsored vaccine to save the day. Dans la lettre adressée aux citoyens américains au printemps 2020 qui accompagnait un versement censé diminuer l’impact économique de la pandémie, le président Donald Trump écrivait : « nous menons une guerre totale contre cet ennemi invisible. » Trump n'avait probablement pas l’intention d'établir un lien explicite avec la célèbre théorie de la « guerre totale » en histoire militaire, néanmoins cet article examine la rhétorique américaine autour de la guerre contre le COVID-19 pour voir dans quelle mesure elle peut correspondre aux définitions de la « guerre totale » dans la pensée stratégique militaire. Les origines clausewitziennes de la notion de « guerre absolue » et de « guerre limitée » seront également examinées afin de déterminer leur pertinence comme cadre conceptuel pour comprendre l’approche américaine dans sa lutte contre le virus. Une stratégie de guerre totale aurait impliqué soit la mobilisation de l’ensemble de la population dans le secteur de la santé, soit l’imposition d’un confinement national total. Cet article examine la stratégie exposée par Donald Trump et la réalité de ce qui a été entrepris par le gouvernement fédéral. Si l’armée a bien participé à l’effort de guerre contre le virus aux États-Unis, cet effort était uniquement logistique et financier. Un confinement national n’a jamais été envisagé en raison de ses effets négatifs potentiels sur l’économie et, de toutes façons, le gouvernement fédéral n’avait pas le pouvoir d’imposer une politique sanitaire aux différents États et autorités locales. Le résultat a été une variété de réponses locales à la crise avec peu de coordination fédérale, un peu comme ce qui s'est passé avec l’épidémie de grippe de 1918-19. Malgré son discours martial et hyperbolique, l’administration Trump n’a pas choisi une stratégie de guerre totale. Au lieu de cela, elle a adopté une stratégie d’attente limitée, acceptant les pertes humaines, tout en cherchant à protéger l’économie jusqu’à ce qu’un vaccin financé par le gouvernement vienne sauver la situation.

Abstract The global lockdowns brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic forced an immediate change in the way people moved about;namely, travel was slowed from a turbulent river to a trickle In-person meetings, often involving long-distance flights, were either canceled, postponed, or shifted over to virtual modes People who were unfamiliar with online meetings quickly became acquainted with them

International audience; Have negative experiences (in particular, natural disasters) that central bankers’ have known in their early life influenced monetary policy decisions in front of the COVID-19 pandemic? We answer this question using a sample of 19 developing countries. We show that central bankers who experienced episodes of epidemics in their early life lowered interest rates faster and lower during the COVID-19 pandemic. Personal experience of decision-makers has contributed strongly to explain their behavior during the crisis.

Covid-19, climate change, flash floods, heat waves, wildfires: the present contribution originates at a moment in history when emergencies and their retinue of emergency measures proliferate, supersede and worsen (less often improve) each other, and when the side effects of one inform and transform our perceptions of the other. Between the environmental consequences of the current disease outbreak, its economic impacts on clean energy transition and the increased frequency of natural disaster...

International audience; Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 caused by SARS-CoV-2, the question of the origin of this virus has been a highly debated issue. Debates have been, and are still, very disputed and often violent between the two main hypotheses: a natural origin through the “spillover” model or a laboratory-leak origin. Tenants of these two options are building arguments often based on the discrepancies of the other theory. The main problem is that it is the initial question of the origin itself which is biased. Charles Darwin demonstrated in 1859 that all species are appearing through a process of evolution, adaptation and selection. There is no determined origin to any animal or plant species, simply an evolutionary and selective process in which chance and environment play a key role. The very same is true for viruses. There is no determined origin to viruses, simply also an evolutionary and selective process in which chance and environment play a key role. However, in the case of viruses the process is slightly more complex because the “environment” is another living organism. Pandemic viruses already circulate in humans prior to the emergence of a disease. They are simply not capable of triggering an epidemic yet. They must evolve in-host, i.e. in-humans, for that. The evolutionary process which gave rise to SARS-CoV-2 is still ongoing with regular emergence of novel variants more adapted than the previous ones. The real relevant question is how these viruses can emerge as pandemic viruses and what the society can do to prevent the future emergence of pandemic viruses.

First published online: 26 May 2020 Panel data covering the French population before and after the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic reveal that self-reported health and well-being have improved during the lockdown in comparison to previous years. We name this counterintuitive phenomenon the “eye of the hurricane” paradox: the large majority of individuals who are not infected by the virus may be seeing their current condition in a more positive light than they normally would. There are, however, divergences across social groups that reflect socioeconomic inequalities. In particular, blue-collar workers deviate from the prevailing trend as their level of self-reported health declines over the lockdown period, Parisian residents experience a sudden drop in their subjective well-being, and people working long hours at home exhibit higher levels of stress during the quarantine. The CoCo project is funded by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (Flash Covid-19 call for projects).

This paper examines the empirical relationship between individuals’ cognitive and non-cognitive abilities and COVID-19 compliance behaviors using cross-country data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). We find that both cognitive and non-cognitive skills predict responsible health behaviors during the COVID-19 crisis. Episodic memory is the most important cognitive skill, while conscientiousness and neuroticism are the most significant personality traits. There is also some evidence of a role for an internal locus of control in compliance. usc Refereed/Peer-reviewed

April 22, 2020 As a social scientist carrying out field work in the Arabian Peninsula, I am used to navigating between periods of seclusion, and others of intense social contact with colleagues, informants or interviewees. By all standards, working on my own in my Omani air conditioned home office for the last month and a half has not been a traumatizing experience. Evidently, colleagues from Sultan Qaboos University where I am an invited researcher are surely missed. Nevertheless, should con...