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On both sides of the Atlantic, in Anglo-Saxon countries, the issue of excess mortality due to Covid-19 among members of minorities has emerged as a central social justice issue. Outside the Anglo-Saxon countries, where race and ethnicity are generally recorded, it is difficult to address this issue. However, in France, data for the period up to the end of confinement, mentioning country of birth and place of death, from "état-civil" files, allow comparisons to be made on the determinants of the severity of Covid-19 integrating ethnicity. Regression analyses based on the difference in death counts between the spring of 2020 and the same period of previous years, show that the interweaving of health status, household size and ethnicity accurately reflects the disparities between departmental mortality rates due to Covid-19. People born in Black Africa clearly appear to be in a worse position than those born in the Maghreb, in Asian and European countries, not to mention the natives, in terms of risk of death.

Uprising in China, the global COVID-19 epidemic soon started to spread out in Europe. As no medical treatment was available, it became urgent to design optimal non-pharmaceutical policies. With the help of a SIR model, we contrast two policies, one based on herd immunity (adopted by Sweden and the Netherlands), the other based on ICU capacity shortage. Both policies led to the danger of a second wave. Policy efficiency corresponds to the absence or limitation of a second wave. The aim of the paper is to measure the efficiency of these policies using statistical models and data. As a measure of efficiency, we propose the ratio of the size of two observed waves using a double sigmoid model coming from the biological growth literature. The Oxford data set provides a policy severity index together with observed number of cases and deaths. This severity index is used to illustrate the key features of national policies for ten European countries and to help for statistical inference. We estimate basic reproduction numbers, identify key moments of the epidemic and provide an instrument for comparing the two reported waves between January and October 2020. We reached the following conclusions. With a soft but long lasting policy, Sweden managed to master the first wave for cases thanks to a low R 0 , but at the cost of a large number of deaths compared to other Nordic countries and Denmark is taken as an example. We predict the failure of herd immunity policy for the Netherlands. We could not identify a clear sanitary policy for large European countries. What we observed was a lack of control for observed cases, but not for deaths.

1st lines: In the upcoming European Council on July 17 and 18, EU member states will fight for a compromise on the European Commission’s main project to tackle the economic fallout of the Covid-19 crisis across Europe: a new 7-year EU budget propped up with a temporary Recovery Instrument (Next Generation EU) amounting to EUR 750 bn of jointly issued debt and to be passed on to EU countries as grants and loans. It is one of the most ambitious in a long line of proposals for European debt mutualisation.While joint borrowing can carry a lot of advantages, debt mutualisation has always been very controversial. Confrontations between those countries supposedly benefiting and losing from mutualising debt have repeatedly centered on the legitimate balance of solidarity and responsibility that such debt implies. Democratic legitimacy in solidarity-responsibility arrangements can be achieved when they can deliver in terms of output legitimacy (being effective in economic terms), input legitimacy (ensuring sufficient room for domestic politics in deciding national policy trajectories) and throughput legitimacy (being run in a transparent and accountable manner).

The European response to COVID-19 has revealed an inconvenient truth. Despite having integrated public health concerns across all its policies – be it agriculture, consumer protection, or security –, the Union cannot directly act to save people’s lives. Only member states can do so. Yet when they adopted unilateral measures to counter the spread of the virus, those proved not only ineffective but also disruptive on vital supply chains, by ultimately preventing the flow of essential goods and people across the Union. These fragmented efforts in tackling cross-border health threats have almost immediately prompted political calls for the urgent creation of a European Health Union. Yet this call raises more questions than answers. With the aim to offer a rigorous and timely blueprint to decision-makers and the public at large, this Special Issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation contextualizes such a new political project within the broader constitutional and institutional framework of EU public health law and policy. By introducing the Special, this paper argues that unless the envisaged Health Union will tackle the root causes of what prevented the Union from effectively responding to COVID19 – the divergent health capacity across the Union –, it might fall short of its declared objective of strengthening the EU’resilience for cross-border health threats.

The current outbreak of COVID-19 has called renewed attention to the need for sound statistical analysis for monitoring mortality patterns and trends over time. Excess mortality has been suggested as the most appropriate indicator to measure the overall burden of the pandemic on mortality. As such, excess mortality has received considerable interest during the first months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Previous approaches to estimate excess mortality are somewhat limited, as they do not include sufficiently long-term trends, correlations among different demographic and geographic groups, and the autocorrelations in the mortality time series. This might lead to biased estimates of excess mortality, as random mortality fluctuations may be misinterpreted as excess mortality. We present a blend of classical epidemiological approaches to estimating excess mortality during extraordinary events with an established demographic approach in mortality forecasting, namely a Lee-Carter type model, which covers the named limitations and draws a more realistic picture of the excess mortality. We illustrate our approach using weekly age- and sex-specific mortality data for 19 countries and the current COVID-19 pandemic as a case study. Our proposed model provides a general framework that can be applied to future pandemics as well as to monitor excess mortality from specific causes of deaths.

contribution à un site web; Several countries in the Western Balkans have responded to the Covid-19 outbreak with draconian measures that entail a further erosion of democracy, writes Natasha Wunsch. She argues the pandemic is shining a spotlight on the impact of geopolitical competition in the Western Balkans, where authoritarian forces are undermining the EU’s democracy promotion efforts.

On 12 March 2020, the sharp fell of U.S. crude oil price to 30 dollars was explained by the outspreads of coronavirus pandemic and the OPEC's inability to reach a production quota agreement. We employ the structural VAR model with time-varying coefficients and stochastic volatility (TVP-SVAR model) developed by Primiceri (2005) to asses the impact of COVID-19 shocks on the energy futures markets, particularly on crude oil and natural gas S&P GS Indexes. The findings confirm that energy commodities S&P GS Indexes respond to COVID-19 shock that varying over time due to fundamentals factors as well as behavioral and psychological factors.

We use data from the COME-HERE longitudinal survey collected by the University of Luxembourg to assess the effects of the policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on life satisfaction in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden over the course of 2020. Policy responses are measured by the Stringency Index and the Economic Support Index from the Blavatnik School of Government. Stringency is systematically associated with lower life satisfaction, controlling for the intensity of the pandemic itself. This stringency effect is larger for women, those with weak ties to the labour market, and in richer households. The effect of the Economic Support is never statistically different from zero.

Economic disruptions due to the global Covid-19 pandemic have unleashed uncountable litigation between firms on how to enforce their contractual relationships. In this context, the survival of undertakings becomes a real issue when partners in vertical relationships or global value chains behave opportunistically. Should this exploitative conduct be scrutinized as anti-competitive practices by the competition authorities in full separation from ordinary courts? In this paper, we argue that the well-known rule of abuse of the state of economic dependence (ASED) could deter opportunism that arises likewise during the Covid-19 pandemic or any other global crises. Actually, rejected by the Chicago School of Antitrust, and not acknowledged by the contract doctrine except its facet of negligent conduct, exploitative abuses could reintegrate the list of harmful practices to the consumers albeit after an intricate analysis. The article further investigates the extent to which the ASED, deterring a wide spectrum of exploitative conduct, fills the gap left by the provisions punishing unfair practices albeit it confers a considerable room for the specialist judges' discretion. Such ASED implementation would ensure more deterrence of the lawful opportunism inasmuch it narrows cracks of the legal corpus between exclusionary and exploitative abuses.; Les perturbations économiques dues à la pandémie mondiale de Covid-19 ont déclenché d'innombrables litiges entre les entreprises sur la manière de faire respecter leurs relations contractuelles. Dans ce contexte, la survie des entreprises devient un réel problème lorsque les partenaires dans les relations verticales ou les chaînes de valeur mondiales se comportent de manière opportuniste. Ce comportement d'exploitation devrait-il être examiné comme des pratiques anticoncurrentielles par les autorités de la concurrence, en toute séparation des tribunaux ordinaires?Dans cet article, nous soutenons que la règle bien connue de l'abus de l'état de dépendance économique (ASED) pourrait dissuader l'opportunisme qui survient également lors de la pandémie de Covid-19 ou de toute autre crise mondiale. En fait, rejetés par la Chicago School de l'antitrust, non reconnus par la doctrine du contrat, à l'exception de sa facette de conduite négligente, les abus d'exploitation pourraient réintégrer la liste des pratiques néfastes pour les consommateurs, bien qu'après une analyse complexe. L’article examine en outre dans quelle mesure l’ASED, dissuadant un large éventail de comportements d’exploitation, comble le vide laissé par les dispositions réprimant les pratiques déloyales, même s’il confère une latitude considérable au pouvoir discrétionnaire des juges spécialisés. L'article soutien que la mise en œuvre de l'ASED assurerait une plus grande dissuasion de l'opportunisme légal dans la mesure où elle rétrécit les fissures du corpus juridique entre les abus d'exclusion et d'exploitation.