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We estimate the causal effect of state-mandated business closures on economic and health outcomes in the context of the COVID-19 crisis in the US. We first show that business closures lead to a substantial drop in sales, earnings, and market values for affected firms. We then exploit sectoral variations in exposure to these restrictions across areas within the same state, and show that locking down 10% of the labor force is associated with a significant contraction in employment, but allows to reduce COVID-19 weekly infection and death rates by respectively 0.023 and 0.0015 percentage points. The findings translate into 24,000 saved lives for a cost of $115 billion. Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that the cost per life saved associated to business closures could have been significantly reduced if restrictions had targeted areas with intense workplace interactions

We examine the influence of economic policy uncertainty on bank stability post-2007-2008 global financial crisis. We rely on the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index introduced by Baker et al. (2016). We use 176,477 quarterly observations for US commercial banks over the period from 2011Q1 to 2020Q3 and find consistent and robust evidence that bank stability decreases as the level of economic policy uncertainty increases. We specifically control for demand-side effects which indicates that the decrease in bank stability not only originates from borrowers' and customers' conditions but also from a change in bank behavior. A deeper investigation shows that the negative impact of policy uncertainty on bank stability is stronger for larger banks, and weaker for highly capitalized banks as well as for more liquid banks. Our findings have important implications particularly for the COVID-19 policy implementations.

This paper shows that prospect theory, extended to account for differences across individuals in their patience and their valuation of the vaccination as a common good can explain why more than 40% of the population has intent to reject the Covid-19 vaccination, as well as the differences in vaccination intentions across population subgroups. Indeed, prospect theory by over-weighting the side effect explains the reject of vaccination. This can be partially compensated by a high patience and/or a large valuation of the collective immunity. The calibrated version of our model, based on an original survey carried out on a representative sample of the adult population living in France allowing us to identify curvatures of their value function, their discount rates and their willingness to cooperate, can predict the evolution of the vaccination intentions between November 2020 an March 2021. We also show that the international differences in the vaccination intentions are closely related to the valuation of the vaccination as a common good.

Textual analysis of 14,270 NBER Working Papers published during 1999–2016 is done to assess the effects of the 2008 crisis on the economics literature. The volume of crisis-related WPs is counter-cyclical, lagging the financial-instability-index. WPs by the Monetary-Economics, Asset-Pricing, and Corporate-Finance program members, hardly refer to “crisis/crises” in the pre-crisis period. As the crisis develops, however, their study-efforts of crisis-related issues increase rapidly. In contrast, WPs in macroeconomics-related programs refer quite extensively in the pre-crisis period to “crisis/crises” and to crises-related topics. Overall, our findings are consistent with the claim that economists were not engaged sufficiently in crises studies before the 2008 crisis. However, counter to the popular image, as soon as the crisis began to unravel, the NBER affiliated economists responded dramatically by switching their focus and efforts to studying and understanding the crisis, its causes and its consequences. Thus, although economists were slow to see the crisis coming, they were fast to act. Preliminary observations on current developments suggest that the economists’ initial response to the ongoing Covid-19 crisis is consistent with these conclusions.

COVID-19 mortality increases markedly with age and is also substantially higher among Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) populations in the United States. These two facts can have conflicting implications because BIPOC populations are younger than white populations. In analyses of California and Minnesota—demographically divergent states—we show that COVID vaccination schedules based solely on age benefit the older white populations at the expense of younger BIPOC populations with higher risk of death from COVID-19. We find that strategies that prioritize high-risk geographic areas for vaccination at all ages better target mortality risk than age-based strategies alone, although they do not always perform as well as direct prioritization of high-risk racial/ethnic groups. Vaccination schemas directly implicate equitability of access, both domestically and globally. Age-based COVID-19 vaccination prioritizes white people above higher-risk others; geographic prioritization improves equity. Description

An aspect of the Covid-19 pandemic that merits attention is its effects on marriage and childbirth. Although the direct fertility effects of people getting the virus may be minor, the impact of delayed marriages due to the first preventive lockdown, such as that imposed in Pakistan from March 14 to May 8 2020, and the closure of marriage halls that lasted till September 14 may be non-negligible. These demographic consequences are of particular import to developing countries such as Pakistan where birth rates remain high, marriage is nearly universal, and almost all child-bearing takes place within marriage. Based on historic marriage patterns, we estimate that the delay in nuptiality during the first wave of coronavirus outbreak may affect about half of the marriages that were to take place during the year. In Pakistan, childbearing begins soon after marriage, and about 37% of Pakistani married women give birth to their first child within twelve months of marriage. A sizeable number out of these around 400,000 annual births that occur within twelve months of the marriage may consequently be delayed. Postponement of marriages due to the accompanying difficult economic situation and employment precariousness should accentuate this fertility effect. The net fertility impact of the Covid-19 outbreak would ultimately depend not only on the delay in marriages but also on the reproductive behavior of existing couples.; Un aspect de la pandémie de Covid-19 qui mérite une attention particulière concerne ses effets sur le mariage et la naissance des enfants. Les conséquences démographiques sont particulièrement importantes pour les pays en développement tels que le Pakistan. Dans ce pays, le taux de natalité est élevé, le mariage est presque universel et la procréation se fait exclusivement dans le cadre dumariage. Bien que les effets directs du virus sur la fertilité des personnes infectées puissent être moins importants, l'impact des mariages retardés en raison des mesures de confinement tecomme celles qui avaient cours au Pakistan du 14 mars au 8 mai 2020, et de la fermeture des salles de mariage qui a duré jusqu'au 14 septembre peut être sérieux. Sur la base des modèles de mariage historiques, nous estimons que le retard de la nuptialité pendant la première vague de la pandémie de coronavirus pourrait affecter environ la moitié des mariages qui devaient avoir lieu pendant l'année. Au Pakistan, la réproduction commence peu après le mariage et environ 37 % des femmes mariées pakistanaises donnent naissance à leur premier enfant dans les douze mois suivant leur mariage. Un nombre non négligeable des 400 000 naissances annuelles qui surviennent dans les douze mois suivant le mariage pourrait donc être retardé. Le report des mariages en raison d'une situation économique difficile et de la précarité de l'emploi devrait accentuer cet effet sur la fécondité. En fin, l'impact net de l'épidémie de Covid-19 sur la fécondité dépendrait en fin de compte non seulement du report des mariages, mais aussi du comportementdes couples existants en matière de reproduction.

International audience; The COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as one of the deadliest infectious diseases on the planet. Millions of people and businesses have been placed in lockdown where the main aim is to stop the spread of the virus. As an extreme phenomenon, the lockdown has triggered a global economic shock at an alarming pace, conveying sharp recessions for many countries. In the meantime, the lockdowns caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have drastically changed energy consumption patterns and reduced CO2 emissions throughout the world. Recent data released by the International Monetary Fund and International Energy Agency for 2020 further forecast that emissions will rebound in 2021. Still, the full impact of COVID-19 in terms of how long the crisis will be and how the consumption pattern of energy and the associated levels of CO2 emissions will be affected are unclear. This review aims to steer policymakers and governments of nations toward a better direction by providing a broad and convincing overview on the observed and likely impacts of the pandemic of COVID-19 on the world economy, world energy demand, and world energy-related CO2 emissions that may well emerge in the next few years. Indeed, given that immediate policy responses are required with equal urgency to address three things—pandemic, economic downturn, and climate crisis. This study outlines policy suggestions that can be used during these uncertain times as a guide

We show that the acceleration index, a novel indicator that measures acceleration and deceleration of viral spread (Baunez et al. 2020a,b), is essentially a test-controlled version of the reproduction number. As such it is a more accurate indicator to track the dynamics of an infectious disease outbreak in real time. We indicate a discrepancy between the acceleration index and the reproduction number, based on the infectivity and test rates and we provide a formal decomposition of this difference. When applied to French data for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, our decomposition shows that the reproduction number consistently underestimates the resurgence of the pandemic since the summer of 2020, compared to the acceleration index which accounts for the time-varying volume of tests. Because the acceleration index aggregates all the relevant information and captures in real time the sizeable time variation featured by viral circulation, it is a sufficient statistic to track the pandemic’s propagation.