doi: 10.5167/uzh-174789
handle: 11104/0114613
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
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doi: 10.5167/uzh-174789
handle: 11104/0114613
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
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Green | |
gold |
citations | 5 | |
popularity | Average | |
influence | Average | |
impulse | Average |
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